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Abstract—We develop an analytical framework for distribution
of popular content in an Information Centric Network (ICN)
that comprises of Access ICNs, a Transit ICN and a Content
Provider. Using a generalized Zipf distribution to model content
popularity, we devise a game theoretic approach to jointly
determine caching and pricing strategies in such an ICN. Under
the assumption that the caching cost of the access and transit
ICNs is inversely proportional to popularity, we show that the
Nash caching strategies in the ICN are 0-1 (all or nothing)
strategies. Further, for the case of symmetric Access ICNs, we
show that the Nash equilibrium is unique and the caching policy
(0 or 1) is determined by a threshold on the popularity of the
content (reflected by the Zipf probability metric), i.e., all content
more popular than the threshold value is cached. We also show
that the resulting threshold of the Access and Transit ICNs, as
well as all prices can be obtained by a decomposition of the joint
caching and pricing problem into two independent caching only
and pricing only problems.
Index Terms—Information Centric Networking (ICN), 5G,
Content Delivery Networks (CCN), Network Pricing, Game
Theory, Content Popularity, Zipfs Law.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vast majority of Internet traffic relates to contentaccess from the sources such as YouTube, Netflix, Bit
Torrent, Hulu, etc. This rapid increase of content delivery in
the Internet has revealed the need for a different networking
paradigm. Further, as Fig. 1 describes, the emerging trend is
that the users are just interested in the information (content),
and not where it is located or perhaps, even how it is delivered.
This high increase in demand for video content in the Internet
and the need for new approaches to control this large volume
of information have motivated the development of future Inter-
net architectures based on named data objects (NDOs) instead
of named hosts [1]. Such architectural proposals are generally
referred to as Information Centric Networking (ICN) which
is a new communication paradigm to increase the efficiency
of content delivery and also content availability [2]-[4] of
future fifth generation (5G) networks. In this new concept, the
network infrastructure actively contributes to content caching
and distribution and every ICN node can cache and serve the
requested content. To fulfill that purpose, several architectures
have been proposed for ICN to reflect current and future
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needs better than the existing Internet architecture [5]-[11].
To provide preferable services to the users in ICN, Internet
service providers (ISPs) or access ICNs should be able to
maintain quality of service (QoS) by improving the response
time for file request. They need to cache the frequently
requested or popular content locally and store them near the
users in the network. To provide QoS, in-network caching is
introduced to provide the network components with caching
ability. Therefore every node actively contributes in content
caching and operates as a potential source of content. This
leads to reduction in network congestion and user access
latency and increase in the throughput of the network by
locally caching the more popular content [12]-[16]. Several
works have claimed that web (file) requests in Internet are
distributed according to Zipfs law [17]-[23]. Zipfs law states
that the relative probability of a request for the ith most
popular content is proportional to 1i . However, several other
studies have found out that the request distribution generally
follows generalized Zipf distribution where the request rate for
the ith most popular content is proportional to 1iγ and γ is a
positive value less than unity [24]-[25].
Since each ICN requires cooperation in caching from other
ICNs to provide a global high performance network, it is
necessary to have pricing policies to incentivize all the ICNs
to contribute to the caching process [26]. Several works have
been done to address the problem of the economics of service
pricing in current Internet and interconnection networks [27]-
[31]. Using contemporary pricing policies cannot incentivize
the lower tier ISPs to cooperate in the future Internet archi-
tecture [32]; hence, we need to have new models to provide
them with monetary incentives to collaborate in caching and
distributing content when content with different popularities
are available in the network.
In this paper, we investigate joint caching and pricing
strategies of the access ICN, the transit ICN and the content
provider based on content popularity. We study Nash strategies
for a non-cooperative game among the above entities using a
probabilistic model by assuming that access requests generally
follow the generalized Zipf distribution. We then use the
insights gained to simplify the problem by replacing two
caching threshold indices instead of caching parameters for
the symmetric case; where all access ICNs have the same
parameters. In our model, the ICNs caching costs vary in
respect to content popularity while the content provider cost
per unit data is fixed for all content types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews some related works. In Section III, we describe the
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Fig. 1. ICN communication model: unlike the current Internet which the
users are interested in the location of the files, the ICN users just look for the
content regardless of file location [47].
system model. The problem formulation for joint caching and
pricing strategies is described in Section IV. We examine the
generalized scenario for arbitrary number of access ICNs in
Section V. The symmetric access ICNs scenario is analyzed
in Section VI. Section VII presents numerical results on the
resulting caching and pricing strategies, and we conclude in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The benefits of in-network caching have been investigated
before in the setting of distributed file systems in several
recent works. In [15], the problem of caching is studied from
an information-theoretic viewpoint. They propose a coded
caching approach that in addition to the local caching gain
is able to achieve a global caching gain. A novel Cooperative
Hierarchical Caching (CHC) framework is proposed in [33],
[34] in the context of Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RAN).
In [35], a collaborative joint caching and processing strategy
for on-demand video streaming in mobile-edge computing net-
work is envisioned.Content caching and delivery in device-to-
device (D2D) networks have been studied in [36]. The aim of
this work is to improve the performance of content distribution
by the use of caching and content reuse. Several approaches
such as base station assisted D2D network and other schemes
based on caching at the user device are compared to show
the improvement of the network throughput in the presence
of in-network caching. Another recent article [37] studies
the limitation of current reactive networks and proposes a
novel proactive networking paradigm where caching plays a
crucial role. It shows that peak data traffic demands can be
substantially reduced by proactively serving users’ demands
via caching. [38] has used a mean field game model to study
distributed caching in ultra dense small cell networks. Zhang et
al have proposed an optimal cache placement strategy based on
content popularity in content centric networks (CCN) in [39].
The authors in [40] have proposed a collaborative caching and
forwarding design for CCN. The problem of joint caching and
pricing for data service for a single Internet service provider
(ISP) is studied in [41]. Similar problem but for multiple ISPs
in the setting of small cell networks is investigated in [42]
using a Stackelberg game. [43] proposes an incentive proac-
tive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks
(SCNs) in order to motivate the content providers to participate
in the caching procedure.
One of the earliest studies of economic incentives in ICNs
has been conducted by Rajahalme et al. [32] and has demon-
strated that top level providers are not willing to cooperate
in the caching process since they cannot get enough revenue.
Another recent study by Agyapong et al. [44] has addressed
the economic incentive problem in ICN by building a simple
economic model to evaluate the incentive of different types of
network players in a hierarchical network infrastructure. They
qualitatively showed that without explicit monetary compen-
sation from publishers, the network will fail to deploy the
socially optimal number of caches. Few prior works have used
game theoretic approaches to solve the problem of caching
and pricing in ICN. In [45] the authors have presented a game
theoretic approach using matrix payoff to analyze the process
of economic incentives sharing among the major network
components. A pricing model was proposed in [46] to study
the economic incentives for caching and sharing content in
ICNs which consists of access ICNs, a transit ICN and a
content provider. This work has shown that if each player’s
caching (pricing) strategy remains fixed, the utility of each
player becomes a concave function of its own pricing (caching)
strategy. Therefore a unique Nash Equilibrium exists in a non-
cooperative pricing (caching) game among different players.
In our earlier work [47], a similar model was adopted to
address the problem of joint caching and pricing strategies in
a network including two access ICNs, one transit ICN and
one content provider. However, content popularity was not
taken into account and the ICNs were agnostic to content type.
The interaction of the above entities is modeled using game
theoretic approach. It was shown that each player can optimize
its caching and pricing strategies in a non-cooperative game.
At the Nash Equilibrium, the caching strategies turn out to be
0-1 (all or nothing) strategies, where each access ICN caches
all the requested demand if its caching cost is less than the
transit ICNs caching cost. When the caching cost of the access
ICN is higher than the transit ICN’s, all the requested content
will be served by either the transit ICN or the content provider,
whichever has the lower caching cost. It means that the content
would be cached in the ICN with smallest caching cost. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the earlier works consider the
problem of joint caching and pricing in an ICN in the presence
of content with different popularity. In contrast, in this paper,
we study joint caching and pricing strategies with the notion of
content popularity for an ICN network with different elements
considering asymmetric utility functions.
2
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Content Popularity
There are M different types of content in the network that
each user is trying to access. Each type of content has a
different measure of popularity reflected by the probability
of requests for it. We consider a model where the popularity
of content is uniformly similar in all parts of the network,
i.e., all users in the network have the same file popularity
distribution. Analyzing the impact of different per-user file
popularities is an open problem. As in previous works (e.g.
[14]-[17], [23]-[25], [36]-[40]), in this paper the distribution
of user requests for content is described by a generalized Zipf
distribution function as follows:
qM (m) =
Ω
mγ
,m = 1, ...,M, (1)
where Ω =
(
M∑
i=1
1
iγ
)−1
and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the exponent
characterizing the Zipf distribution in which γ = 0 makes
the distribution uniform and all the content will be identical
in popularity, whereas the case of γ = 1 corresponds to
one where the content popularity distribution is following the
classic Zipf’s law and more popular content is dominant in
the network. The content is ranked in order of their popularity
where content m is the mth most popular content, i.e., m = 1
is the most popular content and m = M is the least popular
content.
In most of the aforementioned works that have studied
in-network caching, the popularity profile of content was
assumed to be identical and perfectly known by all the network
components. In reality, the demand and popularity are not
predictable and certain [48], [49]. The problem of caching
has been studied in [50] wherein the users have access to
demand history but no knowledge about popularity. Several
other papers have used learning-based approaches to estimate
the popularity profile at the user side [51]-[56]. While content
learning is more accurate for modeling content popularity,
the reason we have used the Zipf model is due to (1)
experimental results showing reasonable fit to the Zipf model
and (2) analytical tractability provided by the Zipf model.
Our framework can be extended by changing the demand
model and considering a repeated game with a parametric Zipf
distribution. In each time slot of the game, this parameter can
be estimated in an optimal way using a learning process.
B. Cost Model
Although the prices are fixed for all types of content, since
the ICNs want to earn more profit by caching the content, they
are more willing to locally store the content which is more
popular. Thus, the access ICNs’ and the transit ICN’s caches
treat the content differently in regard to their popularity. As
the content gets more popular, the ICNs incur less caching
costs to locally store the content.
Definition 1. For a finite cache, the caching costs of access
and transit ICNs is defined to be inversely proportional to the
content popularity as follows
cxi =
cx0
qM (i)
, (2)
where, without loss of generality, cx0 is a fixed initial caching
cost at ICN x.
Using equations (1) and (2), we see in Fig. 3, for fixed
values of i, cxi is a decreasing function of γ when i is small
(i.e., more popular content). On the other hand, cxi is an
increasing function of γ when i is large (i.e., less popular
content). Unlike the access and transit ICNs, the content
provider has no priority for caching the content and caches
all types of content. The content provider incurs the constant
cost cO for every unit of data that it serves for the transit ICN.
C. Access and Demand Model
For simplicity in illustration, as shown in Fig. 2, we begin
with a hierarchical network model [46], [57] with two access
ICNs (A and B), one transit ICN (C), one content provider
(O) and an arbitrary number of users who can switch from
one access ICN to another. The access ICNs connect the end-
users to the content network and the transit ICN provides
wide-area transport for the access ICNs while the content
provider provides the content for the users. Fig. 2 also shows
the monetary and data flows among different entities with the
various prices described in Table I. The network economy
depends on two effective factors: caching and pricing. Under
the assumption that each ICN can have access to all content,
it can decide to either cache the entire or portion of the
requested content, or get it from somewhere else. The caching
strategy adopted by each entity is denoted by the parameter α
that takes values in the interval [0, 1]. Every ICN decides to
cache different types of content independently, therefore, we
have a specific caching variable for each type of content. We
have denoted αI,Si , where I can either be access or transit
ICN and S is any cache in the network (possibly another
ICN or content provider), as the fraction of ICN I’s demand
for content type i that comes from cache S. Each ICN also
has different pricing strategies. These strategies are the prices
that each player charges others for the provided service. The
pricing is based on the usage, i.e., price per unit data. Each
access ICN sets two different prices: (1) the network price
per unit data for transporting the content; and (2) the storage
price per unit data for providing content from its cache for
other ICNs. For example, the network and storage prices for
access ICN A are denoted as P (n)A and P
(s)
A , respectively.
The total price per unit data is the sum of these two prices
and is denoted by PA = P
(n)
A + P
(s)
A . We will find it useful
to utilize an alternative form of the above. Following the
charging policies of several storage services for the Internet
such as Amazon S3, it would be practical to assume that the
storage price is typically less than the network price. The linear
relationship between network price and storage price while
empirical, has been used earlier in [46] and we follow this
assumption. It can be represented by P (n)A = βAP
(s)
A where
βA > 1. Thus, the relationship between PA and P
(s)
A would be
P
(s)
A =
(
1
1+βA
)
PA. As a result, each access ICN or transit
3
Fig. 2. Interaction between different entities in a simplified model of an ICN
[47].
ICN will have a set of strategies for pricing in the interval
[0,∞). The content provider pricing strategies set also consists
of the content price P (c)O that the users should pay for content
and the storage price P (s)O which is the price for providing
the content from the content provider cache. The access ICN
A and B charge prices PA and PB to their users and P
(s)
A
and P (s)A to the transit network if they store or forward the
content that the transit ICN had asked for. The transit ICN C
charges access ICNs A and B with price PC , if it stores or
forwards their requested content. The content provider charges
users with content price P (c)O and transit ICN C with storage
price P (s)O if it stores transit ICN requested content.
To model the behavior of users, we have considered content
demand at each access ICN to be a linear function of the
prices.
Definition 2. The users’ demands are affected by both content
price and access price and defined to be a linear function as
follows:
σA = 1− ρAPA + ρBPB − ρ0P (c)o
σB = 1 + ρAPA − ρBPB − ρ0P (c)o
(3)
where ρA, ρB and ρ0 are the reflective coefficients of the
prices’ influence on users demands and are positive. The
demands are normalized per unit data. We observe that the
users demands directly depend on the access ICNs prices
and content price. For example, as the content price P (c)O
increases, the users demands decrease. If one of the access
ICNs increases its price, the users will switch to the other
ICN. Table I summarizes our notation.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the interaction between different
entities in the ICN model results in a conflict among the ICNs
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATION
Notation Description
K Number of access ICNs
P
(n)
k
Network price of ICN k per unit data
P
(s)
k
Storage price of access ICN or content provider k per unit
data
PC Transit price charge by transit ICN C
Pk Access ICN k’s price to its users per unit data
P
(c)
O Content price of content provider O per unit data
ρk
Reflective coefficient of prices influence on access ICN k’s
user demand
σk Normalized total user demands for ICN k per unit data
σki
Normalized total user demands for ICN k for content type
i per unit data
αI,Si
Fraction of ICN I’s demand for content type i that comes
from cache S
cki Caching cost of ICN k for content type i
ck0 Initial caching cost of ICN k
cO Content provider O cost
βk
Scaling parameter between network price and storage price
(greater than unity)
γ Zipf popularity law exponent
Th Caching threshold index for access ICNs
ThC Caching threshold index for transit ICN C
qM (m)
Popularity (request rate) for content type m over a set of
M content
(players) when they unilaterally try to maximize their revenue.
In the following section, we use a game theoretic approach to
solve the joint caching and pricing strategies for each entity
in the ICN network.
IV. JOINT CACHING AND PRICING STRATEGY
A. Utility Function
Each ICN can cache the content or just forward the requests
to other ICNs or content provider based on the utility that
it gains. The utility function for each player is defined as
the utility received by providing the services for others. Each
player incurs a caching cost with respect to the popularity of
the content when it stores a unit of data. Therefore, as shown
in Fig. 2, the utility functions for the access ICNs A and B, the
transit ICN C and the content provider O can be formulated
as an opportunistic function in terms of the prices, caching
costs, demands and fraction of content stored and popularity.
The access ICN A incurs a caching cost of cAi for content
type i if it decides to store a unit of data. Therefore, the utility
function of the access ICN A is given as the average utility
for all different types of content as follows:
UA =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)

σAαA,Ai (PA − cAi) +
σAαA,Outi (PA − PC) +
σBαB,Ai
((
1
1+βA
)
PA − cAi
)
 , (4)
where the first term in (4) is the utility that results when ICN
A stores a portion of its users demands in its own cache.
qM (i) denotes the popularity (request rate) of content type i
over a set of M different types of content, σA is the total
demand that users have requested to the access ICN A and
αA,Ai is the fraction of ICN A’s demand for content type i
that is going to be served by ICN A’s cache. Therefore, σA
multiplied by qM (i) and αA,Ai is the demand of access ICN
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A for content type i that is served by transit ICN A’s cache
and (PA − cAi) is the revenue of access ICN A by serving
this portion of the requested demand. The second term is the
utility that results when ICN A forwards a portion of its users
demand to the transit ICN C. The third term is the utility that
results when the transit ICN C forwards a portion of ICN B’s
users’ demand to ICN A. The access ICN A can control only
the caching and pricing parameters αA,Ai , PA and P
(s)
A . Note
that αA,Outi = 1−αA,Ai or αA,Outi = αA,Bi+αA,Ci+αA,Oi .
The utility function of the access ICN B can be defined in a
similar way as follows:
UB =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)

σBαB,Bi (PB − cBi) +
σBαB,Outi (PB − PC) +
σAαA,Bi
((
1
1+βB
)
PB − cBi
)
 . (5)
The access ICN B can control only the caching and pricing
parameters αB,Bi , PB and P
(s)
B . Note that αB,Outi = 1 −
αB,Bi or αB,Outi = αB,Ai +αB,Ci +αB,Oi . The transit ICN
C gains a profit if the access ICNs A and B request a content
through it. Equation (6) consists of two terms. The first term
is the utility that results when transit ICN C stores ICN A and
B’s content in its own cache and the second term is the utility
that results when it forwards ICN A and B’s content to other
ICN’s or content provider. We model the ICN C’s utility in
the following way:
UC =
∑
X∈{A,B}
M∑
i=1
qM (i)σXαX,Ci(PC − cCi)+∑
X∈{A,B}
∑
L∈{A,B,O},L6=X
L∑
i=1
qM (i)σXαX,Li(PC − P (s)L )
,
(6)
where the transit ICN C has control over caching variables
αA,Bi , αA,Ci , αA,Oi , αB,Ai , αB,Ci , αB,Oi and PC . Finally, if
the requests are not served by any access ICNs or transit ICN,
they will be forwarded to the content provider that has all
the content in its cache and the costs for all types of content
are identical and equal to cO. The content provider’s utility
function can be expressed formally as
UO =
M∑
i=1
qM (i) [σAαA,Oi + σBαB,Oi ]
(
P
(s)
O − cO
)
+ (σA + σB)P
(c)
O .
(7)
The first term in (7) results when the content provider O
charges transit ICN C with storage price to deliver the re-
quested content to it. The second term comes from the content
price that content provider charges the users. The content
provider can control pricing parameters P (c)O and P
(s)
O .
Because of the competitive nature of this problem, we
can present a solution in the analytical setting of a game
theoretic framework. Let G = [N, {Sj} , {Uj (.)}] denote
the non-cooperative game among players from the set N =
{A,B,C,O} , where Sj = (Pj , αj) is the set of joint
caching (αj) and pricing (Pj) strategies and Uj (.) is the
utility function of player j. The strategy space of all the entities
excluding the jth player is denoted by S−j . In the joint caching
and pricing game, each player tries to maximize its own utility
by solving the following optimization problem for all j ∈ N ,
max
sj∈Sj
Uj (sj , S−j) ,∀j ∈ N. (8)
It is necessary to characterize a set of caching and pricing
strategies where all the players are satisfied with the utility
they receive, given the strategy selection of other players.
Such an operating point, if it exists, is called equilibrium. The
notion that is most widely used for game theoretic problems is
the Nash Equilibrium(NE) [58]. A set of pricing and caching
strategies S∗j =
(
P ∗j , α
∗
j
)
constitutes a NE if for every j ∈ N ,
Uj
(
s∗j , S−j
) ≥ Uj (sj , S−j) for all sj ∈ Sj . The NE of the
game is one where no player benefits by deviating from her
strategy unilaterally.
B. Characterization of Nash Strategies
To find the NE using the best response functions we need
to solve the four following optimization problems for ICN A,
ICN B, ICN C and the content provider O, respectively. The
maximization problem for ICN A is:
max
αA,Ai ,PA
UA =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)

σAαA,Ai (PC − cAi) +
σA (PA − PC) +
σBαB,Ai
((
1
1+βA
)
PA − cAi
)

s.t. 0 ≤ αA,Ai ≤ 1 , PA > 0
,
(9)
where the access ICN A tries to maximize her utility by
changing its caching (αA,Ai ) and pricing (PA) strategies while
other players’ strategies are unknown to her. Similarly, the
maximization problem for ICN B is:
max
αB,Bi ,PB
UB =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)

σBαB,Bi (PC − cBi) +
σB (PB − PC) +
σAαA,Bi
((
1
1+βB
)
PB − cBi
)

s.t. 0 ≤ αB,Bi ≤ 1 , PB > 0
.
(10)
The transit ICN C maximization problem is given as the
following equation:
max
αA,Ci ,αB,Ci ,αA,Bi ,αA,Oi ,αB,Ai ,αB,Oi ,PC
UC =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)σA
×
{
αA,Ci (PC − cCi) +
αA,Bi
(
PC − P (s)B
)
+ αA,Oi
(
PC − P (s)O
) }
+
M∑
i=1
qM (i)σB
{
αB,Ci (PC − cCi) +
αB,Ai
(
PC − P (s)A
)
+ αB,Oi
(
PC − P (s)O
) }
,
s.t.
αA,Ai + αA,Bi + αA,Ci + αA,Oi = 1
αB,Bi + αB,Ai + αB,Ci + αB,Oi = 1
0 ≤ αA,Bi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αA,Ci ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αA,Oi ≤ 1
0 ≤ αB,Ai ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αB,Ci ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αB,Oi ≤ 1
PC ≥ 0
(11)
5
and the content provider O maximizes its utility using equation
(12)
max
P
(c)
O ,P
(s)
O
UO = (σA + σB)P
(c)
O
+
M∑
i=1
qM (i) [σAαA,Oi + σBαB,Oi ]
(
P
(s)
O − cO
)
s.t. P
(C)
O > 0, P
(s)
O > cO
(12)
Theorem 1. The caching variables αI,Si take on values of
either 0 or 1 at the equilibrium of the caching and pricing
strategies game.
Proof: The solution of a maximization (minimization)
problem with an objective function that has a linear re-
lationship with the variable is the boundary point of the
feasible interval. Therefore, since the relationship between
utility function and caching parameters are linear to maximize
the utility functions, they just take on the boundary values.
Since αI,Si ∈ [0, 1], therefore, they can be either 0 or 1.
Given Theorem 1, it follows that all caching variables adopt
binary values. For example, according to equation (9), if PC >
cAi , the caching variable αA,Ai should be 1 to maximize the
access ICN A’s utility function. Whenever PC > cAi it means
that the transit price for delivering the requested content type
i to users under the access ICN A is smaller than the caching
cost of access ICN A for locally storing the requested file
itself. Therefore the access ICN decides to store the content
locally in its cache rather than transferring the request to transit
ICN C. That is the reason that caching variable αA,Ai gets
the value 1. The caching strategies at equilibrium for different
conditions are summarized in Table II.
Unlike the caching parameters which only get binary values;
the pricing parameters can be continuous. Therefore, this
optimization problem is a mixed integer program with multiple
objective functions, and in general, the uniqueness of the
NE in terms of pricing and caching strategies cannot be
characterized.
V. GENERALIZATION TO K ACCESS ICNS
We can extend the case of two access ICNs, one transit ICN
and one content provider to a generalized scenario of K access
ICNs, one transit ICN and one content provider. We consider
K˜ = {A1, A2, ..., AK} as the set of access ICNs which are
connected to transit ICN C and α is the set of all caching
variables. The demand function of each access ICN is defined
in Definition 3.
Definition 3. The received demands at access ICN Aj is
defined as
σAj = 1− ρAjPAj + 1K−1
[
K∑
k=1,k 6=j
ρAkPAk
]
−ρ0P (c)o ,∀j = 1, ...,K.
(13)
The received demand of content type i by access ICN Aj
can be shown as σAji = σAjqM (i). Following the previous
section, the maximization problem of each access ICN Aj ∈
K can be defined as follows:
max
αAj,Aji
,PAj
UAj =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)

σAjα(Aj,Aj)i
(
PC − cAji
)
+σAj
(
PAj − PC
)
+((
1
1+βAj
)
PAj − cAji
)
×∑
k∈K˜,k 6=Aj
σkα(k,Aj)i

s.t. 0 ≤ αAj ,Aji ≤ 1 , PAj > 0
(14)
The transit ICN C maximization problem is given by the
following equation:
max
α,PC
UC =
∑
k∈K˜
M∑
i=1
qM (i)σkαk,Ci(PC − cCi)
+
∑
k∈K˜
∑
L∈K˜∪{O},L 6=k
M∑
i=1
qM (i)σkαk,Li(PC − P (s)L )
s.t.
α(Aj ,Aj)i +
∑
L∈K˜∪{C,O}
L 6=Aj
α(Aj ,L)i = 1
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
PC ≥ 0
(15)
and the content provider O maximizes its utility using equation
(16).
max
P
(c)
O ,P
(s)
O
UO =
M∑
i=1
qM (i)
[ ∑
k∈K˜
σkαk,Oi
](
P
(s)
O − cO
)
+
∑
k∈K˜
σkP
(c)
O
s.t. P
(C)
O > 0, P
(s)
O > cO
(16)
Theorem 1 can be extended for the generalized K Access
ICN case with the same reasoning and all the caching variables
take binary values (i.e., all or nothing 0-1 strategies). So,
the joint caching and pricing strategy game in the general
form is also a mixed integer program. In the next section we
will simplify the problem with the assumption of symmetric
access ICNs with similar characteristics and try to give some
analytical and intuitive results.
VI. SYMMETRIC ACCESS ICNS SCENARIO ANALYSIS
In the previous section, the general form of the caching and
pricing strategies for ICNs was formulated through equations
(14)-(16) as a set of mixed integer programs. In this section,
in order to analytically study the equilibrium of our proposed
model, we consider the symmetric scenario, where all access
ICNs have the same specifications. For the symmetric scenario,
where all the access ICNs are exactly the same, we consider
ρk = ρ, βk = β, ck0 = c0∀k ∈ K˜.
Theorem 2. In the symmetric case, for each content type i,
αAk,Aji = 0, ∀k 6= j.
Proof: According to equations (14), when access ICN
Aj receives a request for content type i and transit price
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TABLE II
CACHING TABLE FOR EACH CONTENT TYPE i
Condition αA,Ai αA,Bi αA,Ci αA,Oi αB,Bi αB,Ai αB,Ci αB,Oi
1 PC >
(
cAi&cBi
)
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
PC > cAi&PC < cBi
2 cCi = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 P (s)O = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 P (s)A = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
PC < cAi&PC > cBi
5 cCi = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
6 P (s)O = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
7 P (s)B = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
PC <
(
cAi&cBi
)
8 cCi = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
9 P (s)O = min
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
A , P
(s)
B
}
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
is greater than its caching cost for that particular type of
content (PC ≥ cAji ), access ICN Aj decides to serve the
requested content itself by adopting value 1 for caching
parameter αAj ,Aji . Since αAj ,Aji = 1, then all the other
caching parameters for content type i would be equal to zero.
On the other hand, if the transit price is less than the access
ICN’s caching cost for content type i (PC < cAji ), the
access ICN Aj will forward the request to the transit ICN
C to be served by choosing αAj ,Aji = 0. When the transit
ICN C receives the request, it should decide to either cache
the content or forward it to the content provider or other
access ICNs based on the payoff that it gains according to
equations (15). Considering the Theorem 1 and the constraint
α(Aj ,Aj)i +
∑
L∈K˜∪{C,O},L 6=Aj
α(Aj ,L)i = 1, one of the caching
parameters should be 1 and others should be 0. If cCi or P
(s)
O
are the minimums among
{
cCi , P
(s)
O , P
(s)
k ∀k ∈ K˜, k 6= Aj
}
,
the transit ICN C (αAj ,Ci = 1) or the content provider
O (αAj ,Oi = 1) will serve the request, respectively. Now
assume that one of the access ICN’s storage price P (s)k
is the minimum. If P (s)k is the minimum, it means that
P
(s)
k <
(
cCi&P
(s)
O
)
. On the other hand, P (s)k > cKi in
order to the access ICN K accepts the request; otherwise it
does not accept the content to prevent from losing payoff.
Therefore, cKi < P
(s)
k < cCi . Note that cKi = cAji in
symmetric scenario. Thus P (s)k should adopt a value greater
than access ICN Aj’s caching cost and less than transit ICN
C’s caching cost for content type i (cAji < P
(s)
k < cCi ).
On the other hand, we know that PC < cAji , therefore
PC < cAji < P
(s)
k <
(
cCi&P
(s)
O
)
. It means that (PC − cCi),(
PC − P (s)k
)
and
(
PC − P (s)O
)
are negative and that is a
contradiction since the transit ICN C is trying to choose PC
in a way to get at least zero payoff. Thus P (s)k can never
be the minimum value among the others and accordingly
αAk,Aji = 0, ∀k 6= j,∀i, in the symmetric scenario case.
To better understand the implication of Theorem 2, we
can refer to Table II that shows the caching strategies at the
equilibrium for asymmetric case with two access ICNs which
are not identical. By assuming two identical access ICNs that
have the same characteristics, the cases 2-7 can be removed
and the table will reduce to just three cases and in all of these
cases αA,Bi = αB,Ai = 0. This table can also be extended
for the generalized scenario with K access ICNs.
What the above theorem reveals is that in the symmetric
case, access ICNs have no motivation to serve each other’s
users. This is not against the philosophy of the content centric
network paradigm, since in this setup the access ICNs and also
the transit ICN are capable of caching the requested content.
Besides, this theorem is just for the Symmetric Scenario and
in the asymmetric setup the access ICNs are able to cache
requests for users of other access ICNs.
Moreover, according to Theorem 2, when the system is
symmetric, we can add the following facts to our models.
αAj ,Ci = αAk,Ci , ∀i
αAj ,Oi = αAk,Oi , ∀i
(17)
So using Theorem 2 and (17), we can reformulate our
maximization problem described in (14)-(16) for symmetric
case. The maximization problems for access ICN Aj can be
expressed in equation (18) as follows:
max
PAj ,αAj,Aji
UAj = σAj
M∑
i=1
qM (i)
{
αAj ,Aji
(
PC − cAji
)
+
(
PAj − PC
) }
s.t. αAj ,Aji ∈ {0, 1} , PAj > 0
(18)
The maximization problem for transit ICN C can be defined
in the following equation:
max
αAj,Ci
αAj,Oi
PC
UC =
K∑
k=1
σAk .
M∑
i=1
qM (i)×
{
αAj ,Ci (PC − cCi) +
αAj ,Oi
(
PC − P (s)O
) }
s.t.
αAj ,Aji + αAj ,Ci + αAj ,Oi = 1,
αAj ,Ci ∈ {0, 1} , αAj ,Oi ∈ {0, 1} , PC > 0,
(19)
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and finally, the content provider maximization problem can be
reformulated as the following
max
P
(c)
O
P
(s)
O
UO =
K∑
k=1
σAk
[
P
(c)
O +
M∑
i=1
qM (i)αAj ,Oi
(
P
(s)
O − cO
)]
s.t. P
(C)
O > 0, P
(s)
O > cO
(20)
As mentioned in Theorem 1, the caching parameters still
take on binary values. Moreover, since the content popularity
probability function qM (i) is monotonically decreasing; ac-
cording to (2), the access and transit ICNs’ caching costs are
monotonically increasing depending on the content type. For
access ICN Aj , the caching parameter αAj ,Aji adopts value
1 when the transit price PC is greater than the access ICN
caching cost cAji . Hence, if αAj ,Aji is 1 for content type i,
it would also be 1 for content type i − 1. It means that if
access ICN decides to cache the content type i, it will cache
all the other content that are more popular than it. So, there
would be a caching threshold index for the number of content
type that access ICN is willing to locally store. We denote the
optimum caching threshold index by ThAj for access ICN Aj .
In the symmetric scenario, the caching threshold indices ThAj
are identical for all access ICNs, so we consider Th as the
caching threshold index for all the access ICNs. Since caching
content types Th+ 1 to M is not beneficial for access ICNs,
they will forward these to the transit ICN C to be served.
The transit ICN C should decide to either serve the content
itself or forward it to somewhere else. In the symmetric case,
as mentioned in Theorem 2, in case it decides not to serve
the content itself, it can forward it to the content provider O.
According to (19), if the content provider storage price P (s)O
is greater than the transit ICN C caching cost cCi , the caching
parameter αAj ,Ci adopts value 1 and the transit ICN C caches
the content type i. On the other hand, if P (s)O is less than cCi ,
the caching parameter αAj ,Ci will be 0 and αAj ,Oi adopts
value 1. In this case, the content provider O will take care of
the request for content type i. As discussed, for access ICNs,
the transit ICN also can have a caching threshold index. It
means that if it caches content type i, it would also be able
to cache the content type i− 1. So there would be a caching
threshold index for the number of content type that the transit
ICN C is willing to locally store. We denote this caching
threshold index by ThC . So the transit ICN C will serve the
content with popularity index Th + 1 to ThC and content
with popularity index greater than ThC will be served by the
content provider O. We can summarize these new parameters
in (21) and (22).
αAj ,Aji =
{
1 i ≤ Th
0 i > Th
,∀j ∈ {1, ...,K} (21)
αAj ,Cji =
{
1 Th+ 1 ≤ i ≤ ThC
0 i ≤ Th ,∀j ∈ {1, ...,K}
αAj ,Oji =
{
1 ThC + 1 ≤ i ≤M
0 i ≤ ThC ,∀j ∈ {1, ...,K}
(22)
Thus, all the caching variables α will be replaced by two
caching threshold indices Th and ThC . By (21) and (22),
the problem set of (18)-(20) can be rearranged using new
parameters Th and ThC . The new maximization problem for
access ICN Aj is given as the following:
max
PAj ,Th
UAj = σAj
[
PAj − Th.c0 − PC
M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i)
]
s.t. 0 ≤ Th ≤M, PAj > 0
(23)
The transit ICN C maximizes its utility function as the
following:
max
PC ,ThC
UC =
(
K −Kρ0P (c)O
)

PC
M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i)
− (ThC − Th) cC0
−P (s)O
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i)

s.t. Th ≤ ThC ≤M, PC > 0
(24)
And the content provider O maximization problem is formu-
lated using new parameters in (25)
max
P
(c)
O ,P
(s)
O
UO =
(
K −Kρ0P (c)O
)
P
(c)
O +
(
P
(s)
O − cO
)
.
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i)

s.t. P
(C)
O > 0, P
(s)
O > cO
(25)
Note that in the above equations qM (0) = qM (M + 1) = 0.
The problem of joint caching and pricing strategies for
the case of symmetric ICNs can be decomposed into two
independent caching and pricing optimization problems. The
caching problem is dealing with the parameters that affect the
caching process and is stated as follows:
• Caching Problem:
min
Th
Th.c0 + PC
M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i)
s.t. 0 ≤ Th ≤M
(26)
max
PC ,ThC
PC
M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i) + (Th− ThC) cC0
− P (s)O
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i)
s.t. Th ≤ ThC ≤M,PC > 0
(27)
max
P
(s)
O
(
P
(s)
O − cO
)
.
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i)
s.t. P
(s)
O > cO
(28)
The outcome of this problem is a 4-tuples(
Th∗, ThC∗, PC∗, P
(s)
O
∗)
. The pricing problem is defined in
(29) and (30) by substituting the 4-tuple resulting from the
caching problem.
• Pricing Problem:
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max
PAj
UAj = σAj
[
PAj − Th∗.c0 − PC∗
M+1∑
i=Th∗+1
qM (i)
]
s.t. PAj > 0
(29)
max
P
(c)
O
UO =
(
K −Kρ0P (c)O
)
P
(c)
O +
M+1∑
i=ThC∗+1
qM (i)
×
(
P
(s)
O
∗ − cO
)

s.t. P
(c)
O > 0
(30)
The K+1-tuple
(
PA
∗
1, ..., PA
∗
K , P
(c)
O
∗)
is the outcome of the
pricing problem. The NE of the joint caching and pricing
problem is
(
Th∗, ThC∗, PC∗, P
(s)
O
∗
, PA
∗
1, ..., PA
∗
K , P
(c)
O
∗)
.
Theorem 3. The caching problem introduced above is a
two player matrix game between transit ICN C and content
provider O.
Proof: According to (14), when the transit price for ICN
C is greater than access ICN’s caching cost for content type
i
(
PC ≥ cAji
)
, the access ICN caches all the content which
are more popular than content type i. Therefore, when cAji ≤
PC < cAji+1 , the optimum caching threshold index chosen
by access ICN will be Th∗ = i. On the other hand, since the
utility function of the transit ICN C has a linear relationship
with the transit price PC , the transit ICN will choose the
maximum value possible that is cAji+1 − ε (ε is a very small
value). Thus, the transit ICN C also can adopt its actions
from a discrete set. There is a caching threshold index Th
corresponding with each transit price chosen by ICN C. It
shows that the transit ICN is the leader in its relationship
with the access ICNs and its action is (PC , Th) from a set of
M + 1 feasible choices. The relationship between the transit
ICN C and the content provider is also a leader follower game.
Depending on the storage price P (s)O , the transit ICN C might
forward some part of demands to the content provider O to be
served. If the access ICN decides to cache the content more
popular than content type Th, the rest of the content should
be forwarded to transit ICN. Therefore, the content type with
index Th+ 1 to M is going to be served in either the transit
ICN or the content provider. When cCj ≤ P (s)O < cCj+1 , the
optimum caching threshold index chosen by the transit ICN
C will be ThC∗ = j. Since, the utility of the content provider
O has a linear relationship with the storage price P (s)O ; the
content provider will pick the maximum value possible for the
storage price that is cCj+1−ε. Thus, for every content provider
storage price, there is a corresponding caching threshold index
chosen by the transit ICN C. Since both the transit ICN C and
the content provider O have a limited set of discrete actions,
the problem introduced in (26)-(28) is a matrix game between
the transit ICN C and the content provider O when the transit
ICN action is the transit price PC and content provider action
is the storage price P (s)O . The access ICNs cannot change the
results and they just follow the transit ICN and their actions.
By Theorem 3, we can discard (26) and solve equations
(27) and (28) jointly to find the integer thresholds Th and
ThC . Note that PC and P
(s)
O are functions of Th and ThC ,
respectively as follows:
PC (Th) =
{
cAjTh+1 − ε 0 ≤ Th ≤M − 1
cAjTh + ε Th = M
(31)
P
(s)
O (ThC) =
{
cCTh+1 − ε 0 ≤ ThC ≤M − 1
cCTh + ε ThC = M
(32)
Proposition 1. f (Th) = PC (Th)
M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i)+ThcC0 and
g (ThC) =
(
P
(s)
O (ThC)− cO
)
.
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i) are concave
sequences and have a unique maximum.
The proof of the above proposition can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
Theorem 4. The symmetric joint caching and pricing game
has a unique NE.
Proof: The solution of the caching and pricing problems
in (26)-(30) is the NE. On the one hand, the caching problem
set is like a leader-follower game and the transit ICN C
(leader) maximizes (27) and the content provider O (follower)
maximizes (28). Since both of them are concave sequences
based on Proposition 1, they have only one maximum in
their feasible sets. By (27), Th∗ can be defined as the
unique optimum value for the access ICN caching threshold
index and by (28), ThC∗ can be defined as the optimum
caching threshold index of the transit ICN C that should
always be greater or equal than Th∗. Assume that ThCmax
is the value that maximizes (28). If ThC∗ < ThCmax then
ThC
∗ = ThCmax and if ThC
∗ ≥ ThCmax then ThC∗ = Th∗.
By finding the first set of parameters and substituting them
in (29) and (30), we can find the second set of parameters.
Since these are concave quadratic functions the problem has
the following unique solution
P
(c)
O
∗
= max
0 ,
1−ρ0
(
P
(s)
O
∗−cO
) M+1∑
i=ThC
∗+1
qM (i)
2ρ0
 ,
PA
∗ = PB∗ = 1ρ
 ρ
(
Th∗.c0 + PC∗
M+1∑
i=Th∗+1
qM (i)
)
+1− ρ0P (c)O
∗
 .
(33)
Note that PA∗j ’s are always greater than zero. Hence, as we
have unique set of results for Th∗ and ThC∗, so PA∗j ’s and
P
(c)
O
∗
are also unique. Therefore the NE exists and is unique.
As the analytical results show, the NE for the symmetric
case is independent of number of access ICNs. So, for the
numerical results section, we consider the scenario with only
two access ICNs.
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Fig. 3. Access ICN caching costs vs index of content for different Zipfs
factor γ.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider the interaction among two symmetric access
ICNs, one transit ICN and a content provider who are compet-
ing to maximize their utilities. In this scenario, the reflective
coefficients of price’s influence on users’ demands ρA, ρB
and ρ0 are set identically to 0.1. These parameters model
the sensitivity of the demands to an increase in the prices.
The scaling parameter between network price and storage
price is set to βA = βB = 10, i.e., the storage price is an
order of magnitude less than the network price. There are
M = 100 different types of content in this network which
are randomly requested by users according to a generalized
Zipf distribution. Fig. 3 shows how the access ICN caching
cost varies for different types of content and different values
of Zipfs factor γ when initial caching cost c0 = 1. As Zipf’s
factor γ is increasing, the distribution of content requested
is getting skewed and according to (2), the caching costs of
more popular content decrease while the caching costs of less
popular content increase. Note that the transit ICN C possibly
has (on average) access to cheaper caches. We denote the ratio
of transit ICN caching cost to access ICN caching cost by R.
We assume that the content provider cost (cO) for all types of
content is identical.
The caching strategies Th∗ and ThC∗ at the equilibrium are
shown in Fig. 4, where Zipfs factor γ is varying in the interval
of 0.01 to 1. In this scenario, the caching cost of transit ICN
C is set to 70% of the caching cost of access ICNs for every
type of content i, i.e., R = 0.7. The results are compared for
cO = 40, 60, 100. As seen, for small amount of γ the content
are less skewed and the caching cost for them is very similar.
Since the caching cost of transit ICN is less than access ICNs’
and content provider’s, it decides to cache most of the content.
But as γ increases, some of the content is getting relatively
more popular. In this case, the access ICNs prefer to cache the
more popular content locally and smaller amount of content
will be cached by transit ICN and content provider. For the
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Fig. 4. Access ICN/transit ICN Caching threshold vs Zipfs factor γ for
various content provider cost cO when R = 0.7.
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Fig. 5. Access ICN/transit ICN Caching threshold vs Zipfs factor γ for
various content provider cost cO when R = 0.5.
higher γ, the caching cost of access ICNs and transit ICN is
getting higher and they do not have an incentive to locally
store them. Therefore, at this point, the content provider starts
to serve more content than before and the transit ICN does
not cache content and just forwards requests to the content
provider. For higher content provider cost cO = 100, since
the cost is so high the content provider just serves the less
popular requested content but as the cost cO increases, it starts
to serve more content. For the case which cO is relatively
small (cO = 40), the transit ICN does not have the incentive
to spend its resources for caching the requested content and
just forwards all the requests for content from access ICNs
to the content provider. The same scenario with R = 0.5 is
examined in Fig. 5. In this case, the transit ICN caching cost
is half of the access ICN caching cost for each type of content.
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Fig. 6. Access price PA vs Zipfs factor γ for various content provider cost
cO and R = 0.7.
So, the transit ICN caches more requested content in its cache.
Fig. 6 shows the access ICN price PA as function of γ
for different content provider costs cO. PA decreases as the
γ gets higher when the content provider cost cO is relatively
low. The reason is that as γ increases, the caching costs of
more popular content at access ICNs caches are getting lower.
Therefore, the access ICNs need to decrease their price PA in
order to compete with other access ICNs. But as the relative
content provider cost cO increases, the access price is getting
higher since both the access ICN and the transit ICN have a
greater incentive to locally cache the content. However, the
price for greater value of cO displays a bimodal behavior as a
function of γ. According to Fig. 3, for relatively small value
of γ, the different types of content have similar popularity and
the access and transit ICN should incur more or less similar
caching costs for each type of content. But as γ increases,
some of the content is getting more popular and the cost
of caching them at the access ICN is decreasing. Therefore,
the access ICN decreases its access price in order to induce
increased demand from the users (see relationship between PA
and demand in equation (3)). On the other hand, when γ keeps
increasing, the transit price and the content provider storage
price increase. Thus, the access ICN needs to slightly increase
its price to compensate the increase in the transit price. After
the slight increase, as γ increases further, the access price
PA decreases again. This is because, as seen from Fig. 4, the
caching strategies Th∗ and ThC∗ are the same for large γ. At
this point, the access ICNs decide to cache the content that are
more popular to get higher payoff. As a result, the access ICN
decreases the price to further incentivize greater user demand
for popular content.
The transit price PC and the content provider storage price
P
(s)
O are shown in Fig. 7. As γ increases, the caching costs of
less popular content that are going to be cached in transit ICN
or content provider caches are increasing. Therefore, both the
transit ICN and content provider should increase their prices
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Transit price and content provider storage price for various content provider cost cO, R=0.7
Zipfs factor γ
Pr
ic
e 
pe
r u
ni
t d
at
a
 
 
Transit price, c
o
=100
content provider storage price, c
o
=100
Transit price, c
o
=80
content provider storage price, c
o
=80
Transit price, c
o
=60
content provider storage price, c
o
=60
Transit price, c
o
=40
content provider storage price, c
o
=40
Fig. 7. Transit price / content provider storage price vs Zipfs factor γ for
various content provider cost cO and R = 0.7.
as shown in the figure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed an analytical framework for
distribution of popular content in an Information Centric
Network (ICN) that comprises of Access ICNs, a Transit ICN
and a Content Provider. By modeling the interaction of the
above entities using game theory and under the assumption
that the caching cost of the access ICNs and transit ICNs
is inversely proportional to popularity, which follows a gen-
eralized Zipf distribution, we first showed that at the NE,
the caching strategies turn out to be 0-1 (all or nothing).
Further, for the case of symmetric Access ICNs, we showed
that a unique NE exists and the caching policy (0 or 1) is
determined by a threshold on the popularity of the content
(reflected by the Zipf probability metric), i.e., all content
more popular than the threshold value is cached. Moreover,
we showed that the resulting threshold indices and prices
can be obtained by a decomposition of the joint caching
and pricing problem into two independent caching only and
pricing only problems. Finally, using numerical results we
showed that as the Zipf’s factor γ increases and the relative
popularity of the content gets skewed, the access ICN just
caches the more popular content and the content provider
serves only requests for less popular content while the transit
ICN just forwards the demands to the content provider without
locally caching any content itself. The insights obtained from
the analysis here warrants further investigation into the case
of asymmetric access ICNs. In this paper, we discussed a
hierarchical scenario with K access ICNs, one transit ICN
and one content provider. In the special case that the transit
ICNs are not ”interconnected’ to each other, the model in this
paper is readily extendable for multiple transit ICNs. However,
a generalized scenario with either multiple ”interconnected”
transit ICNs or multiple content providers is a direction for
future work. Extension of the above model to scenarios where
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the content popularity may need to be learned is also of
interest.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Two sequences f (Th) and g (ThC) defined in Proposition
1 are concave sequences.
A sequence S is strictly concave if the below inequality
holds for every n.
S (n+ 1) + S (n− 1)− 2S (n) < 0
As stated before, qM (i) = 1( M∑
j=1
1
jγ
)
iγ
for = 1, ...,M and
qM (i) = 0 for i > M . Using (31) for Th = 1, ...,M − 1, we
have
PC (Th) = c0(Th+ 1)
γ
M∑
i=1
(
1
i
)γ − ε
Since ε is so small and tends to zero, it can be considered
as zero. Therefore, for Th = 1, ...,M − 1, the sequence f is
defined as follows
f (Th) =
[
c0(Th+ 1)
γ
M∑
i=1
(
1
i
)γ] M+1∑
i=Th+1
qM (i) + ThcC0
⇒ f (Th) = [c0(Th+ 1)γ ]
M+1∑
i=Th+1
(
1
i
)γ
+ ThcC0
To prove concavity, we need to have
f (Th+ 1) + f (Th− 1)− 2f (Th) < 0⇒
[(Th+ 2)
γ − 2(Th+ 1)γ + Thγ ]
M+1∑
i=Th+2
(
1
i
)γ
< 1−
(
Th
Th+1
)γ
.
If this inequality holds for all M and Th = 1, ...,M − 1,
then the sequence f is concave. We introduce ϕγ (Th) =
[(Th+ 2)
γ − 2(Th+ 1)γ − Thγ ]. Two functions ϕ0 (Th)
and ϕ1 (Th) are zero for all Th that satisfy the above
inequality. It means that for γ = 0 and γ = 1, f is a concave
sequence. Moreover, ϕγ (Th) can be written as
ϕγ (Th) = [(Th+ 2)
γ − (Th+ 1)γ ]− [(Th+ 1)γ + Thγ ]
⇒ ϕγ (Th) =
(
Th
Th+1
)γ
+
(
Th+2
Th+1
)γ
− 2.
Since
(
Th
Th+1
)γ
+
(
Th+2
Th+1
)γ
< 2 for 0 < γ < 1, ϕγ (Th)
is negative for all Th = 1, ...,M − 1 and M which cause
that above inequality be satisfied. Therefore, f is a concave
sequence for all M and all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 .
Using (32) for ThC = 1, ...,M − 1, we have
P
(s)
O (ThC) = cC0(ThC + 1)
γ
M∑
i=1
(
1
i
)γ − ε
Since ε is so small and tends to zero, it can be considered as
zero. Therefore, for ThC = 1, ...,M − 1, the sequence g can
be defined as
g = cC0(ThC + 1)
γ
M∑
i=ThC+1
(
1
i
)γ − cO M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i)
On the other hand, we can show that if two sequences are
concave the sum of them is also concave. Assume that g =
Ψ + ∆. If Ψ and ∆ are concave, we have
Ψ (n+ 1) + Ψ (n− 1)− 2Ψ (n) < 0
and
∆ (n+ 1) + ∆ (n− 1)− 2∆ (n) < 0.
Therefore,
Ψ (n+ 1) + ∆ (n+ 1) + Ψ (n− 1) + ∆ (n− 1)
−2 [Ψ (n) + ∆ (n)] < 0
That means
g (n+ 1) + g (n− 1)− 2g (n) < 0
We already showed that the first term of sequence g is
concave, so we just need to show that the second term
∆ (ThC) = −cO
M+1∑
i=ThC+1
qM (i) is also concave. Then, we
have to show that the following inequality holds for every
ThC = 1, ...,M − 1
∆ (ThC + 1) + ∆ (ThC − 1)− 2∆ (ThC) < 0
By doing some algebra, we will get qM (ThC) >
qM (ThC + 1) that holds for ThC = 1, ...,M−1, since qM (i)
is a strictly decreasing function. That completes the proof. 
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